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Abstract
Freivalds and Smith [R. Freivalds, C.H. Smith Memory limited inductive inference machines, Springer Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 621 (1992) 19–29] proved that probabilistic limited memory inductive inference machines can learn with
probability 1 certain classes of total recursive functions, which cannot be learned by deterministic limited memory inductive
inference machines. We introduce quantum limited memory inductive inference machines as quantum finite automata acting
as inductive inference machines. These machines, we show, can learn classes of total recursive functions not learnable by any
deterministic, nor even by probabilistic, limited memory inductive inference machines.
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1. Introduction
E.M. Gold, in a seminal paper [20], defined the notion of identification in the limit. This notion concerned learning
by algorithmic devices now called Inductive Inference Machines (IIMs). See the survey Angluin and Smith [4]. An
IIM inputs the graph of a total recursive function, an ordered pair at a time, and while doing so, outputs computer
programs. Since we will only discuss the inference of total recursive functions, we may assume, without loss of
generality, that the input is received by an IIM in its natural domain increasing order, f (0), f (1), . . . . An IIM, on
input from a function f will output a potentially infinite sequence of programs p0, p1, . . . . The IIM converges if
either the sequence is finite, say of length n + 1, or there is a program p such that pi = p for all but finitely many i .
In the former case we say that the IIM converges to pn , and in the latter case, to p. In general, there is no effective
way to tell when, and if, an IIM has converged.
Following Gold, one says that an IIM M identifies a function f in the limit, written f ∈ EX (M), if, when M
is given the graph of f as input, it converges to a program p that computes f . The terms infer and learn are used
as synonyms for identify. If M identifies a function f , then some form of learning must have taken place, since,
by the properties of convergence, only finitely much of the graph of f was known to M at the (unknown) point of
convergence.
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Every total recursive function is of course identifiable by some IIM.
Each IIM will learn some set of recursive functions. The collection of all such sets, over the universe of effective
algorithms viewed as IIMs, serves as a characterization of the learning power inherent in the Gold model. This
collection is symbolically denoted by EX (for explanation), and it is rigorously defined by EX = {U | ∃M (U ⊆
EX (M))}. Gold [20] showed that the set of all total recursive functions is not in EX .
Probabilistic IIMs were introduced in Pitt [26] and studied further in Pitt and Smith [27]. Very roughly, a
probabilistic IIM is an IIM that makes use of a fair coin. Write f ∈ Pr EX (M)〈p〉 if M learns f with probability
at least p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and put Pr EX〈p〉 = {U | ∃M (U ⊆ Pr EX (M)〈p〉)}. Pitt [26] showed that for p > 12 ,
Pr EX〈p〉 = EX .
An IIM M identifies a function f finitely, written f ∈ F I N (M), if, when M is given the graph of f as input, it
outputs exactly one program that computes f , and then the machine stops. F I N = {U | ∃M (U ⊆ F I N (M))} is then
the collection of all sets of finitely identifiable functions.
Write f ∈ Pr F I N (M)〈p〉 if M is probabilistic, and the probability that M identifies f finitely is at least p, and
put Pr F I N 〈p〉 = {U | ∃M (U ⊆ Pr F I N (M)〈p〉)}. Freivalds [14] showed that for p > 23 , Pr F I N 〈p〉 = F I N .
Valuable intuition about machine learning has been gained by working with Gold’s model and its derivatives. See
Arikawa and Mukouchi [7] for a discussion of this influence. In the next Section, we describe the variants of Gold’s
model that we then examine in a quantum setting. We note that quantum versions of other models of learning have
been considered by other authors, in [30,31,21] for example, but of different nature than ours’.
2. Limited memory learning
The study of inference machines with limited memory began in Wiehagen [33], and was pursued by S. Arikawa
and his students [5,6], by Wiehagen and Zeugmann [34], and by others. This research concluded that restricting the
data available to the inference machine also reduces its learning potential.
Our models closely follow those of Freivalds and Smith [16], a conference paper later incorporated into a larger
journal paper [17]. See also [19]. To insure an accurate accounting of the memory used by an IIM, we assume that the
IIM cannot back up and reread an input after another one has been read. To avoid coding issues, the memory used is
measured in bits, as opposed to integers.
Under these conventions, we write U ⊆ LEX (M) iff there is a constant c such that for any f ∈ U , the machine
M uses no more than c bits of memory, exclusive of the input, and f ∈ EX (M). One formalization of this notion
sees memory limited IIMs as Turing machines with input tape and work tape. The input tape is read only once (one
way) and the work tape has only c bits of storage capacity. An equivalent formalization is to view memory limited
IIMs as finite automata. The collection {U | ∃M (U ⊆ LEX (M)}, of all sets of functions inferable by limited memory
inference machines, is denoted by LEX . It is clear that LEX ⊂ EX .
Natural numbers will serve as names for programs. The function computed by program i is denoted by φi , and
we assume that φ0, φ1, . . . form an acceptable programming system [29]. To get a rough idea of the relative learning
power of LEX -type inference, consider the set U0 of total functions of finite support ( f ∈ U0 iff f (x) = 0 for all but
finitely many x), and the set U1 of self describing functions ( f ∈ U1 iff φ f (0) = f ). These sets were introduced in
Blum and Blum [10] and used in [15–18] to separate various classes of learnable sets of functions. It was in particular
shown in [16] that U1 ∈ LEX but U0 /∈ LEX .
Limiting the memory available to a probabilistic IIM according to our conventions, gives rise to the class
PrLEX〈p〉. It was shown in [16], see also [17], that a probabilistic limited memory machine could learn with
probability 1 when deterministic limited memory machines cannot learn: there is a classU of total recursive functions
such that U ∈ PrLEX〈1〉 but U /∈ LEX . A surprising statement, perhaps, if “with probability 1” is thought
equivalent to “deterministic” (which it is not, of course).
By analogy with the above, it is straightforward to define classes LF I N and PrLF I N 〈p〉 by imposing memory
limitation on finite learning of recursive functions. The learning is now done by an IIM with finite memory, and it
terminates after a finite number of steps. Such an IIM may be realized by a one-way finite automaton, which reads
the values of an input function in the natural order of its natural argument, in finite time outputs a single program, and
stops. Surprisingly, we found no published results on finite learning by limited memory inductive inference machines.
Our concept of finite memory finite learning is indeed limited. The values of a target function can be arbitrarily
large, while our inference machine, being a finite automaton, can only distinguish between a finite number of integers.
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In terms of its input-output behavior this means that the machine can essentially only replicate the currently read value
of the target function, and, we require that it does this only once.
This limited concept of learning could easily be strengthened, we remark, by involving a stronger notion of
automata, such as the notion of finite automata of Blum, Shub and Smale [12]. A BSS-automaton can process
arbitrarily large integers but it cannot distinguish large numbers. It can store integers in a finite set of registers, and
it can move integers from one register to another. When used as inductive inference machine, it could output target
function values, which it had read at earlier moments. However, we observe, a BSS-automaton would still not always
be able to learn deterministically what it can learn with probability 1; see [16,17].
3. Quantum finite automata
Quantum finite automata were introduced in Kondacs and Watrous [22]; another, weaker, definition was given in
Moore and Crutchfield [23], the technical report version of which appeared the same year. Superficially, quantum
automata appear rather similar to probabilistic automata, with unitary transition matrices in place of stochastic
matrices. Their computational characteristics, however, are quite different; Wiesner and Crutchfield [35] discuss this
point in depth. Also, the formal similarity diminishes if one is to allow mixed quantum states, as in Nayak [24] and
Ambainis et al. [3].
With limited memory learning in mind, we only consider one-way automata, and settle for the basic Kondacs–
Watrous and Moore–Crutchfield models, summarized in Brodsky and Pippenger [11]. We briefly recall the ground
notions in the context of language recognition. A quantum finite automaton is then a tuple M = (Q, q0, pi;Σ , δσ,σ∈Σ˜ ),
where Q = {1, 2, . . . , q} is a finite set of states; q0 ∈ Q is the initial state; pi = {A, R, N } is a partition of Q into
accepting, rejecting, and non-halting states; Σ is a finite input alphabet, Σ˜ = Σ ∪ {#, $}, the extra symbols marking
the extent of a word x ∈ Σ ∗ written x˜ = #x$; and δσ are unitary q × q (transition) matrices, σ ∈ Σ˜ . The automaton
M is real or rational if δσ have real or rational entries, respectively. Note, if all δσ are permutation matrices, the
automaton is deterministic reversible.
When working as an ‘acceptor’ (or ‘recognizer’), M receives words #x$, and, for every input x ∈ Σ ∗, it produces
two real numbers, pA(x) and pR(x), in the interval [0, 1], the probabilities of acceptance, and of rejection, of the
word x , respectively. M is then said to accept (or: recognize) a language L ⊂ Σ ∗ with probability p > 1/2 provided
pA(x) ≥ p if x ∈ L , while pR(x) ≥ p if x /∈ L . The numbers pA(x) and pR(x) are arrived at as follows.
Working in the one-way mode, M reads x˜ = σ0 . . . σs+1 letter by letter, from left to right, say. First, however, M
sets its initial ‘amplitude distribution’ to the (column) vector ξ0i = 1 if i = q0 and ξ0i = 0 otherwise. Upon reading
σ = σ0, M updates ξ0 to ξ = δσ ξ0, whereby the vector |ξ |2 of squared moduli |ξi |2 is a distribution of probabilities
‘for M to be in state i’.
If a Moore–Crutchfield ‘measure-once’ automaton, M now reads the remaining letters σ , each time updating its
amplitude distribution by δσ . Much like in the case of probabilistic automata, only the final distribution δσs+1 ·· · ··δσ0ξ0
is observed: it is measured with respect to the partition pi . The numbers pA(x) and pR(x) are the probabilities of
observing an accepting state, i ∈ A, and a rejecting state, i ∈ R, respectively. Or, if a Kondacs–Watrous ‘measure-
many’ automaton, for every letter σ it reads, M follows up the unitary update by measurement with respect to pi . With
a probability p σA (x) it observes an accepting state, with a probability p
σ
R (x) it observes a rejecting state; if it observes
neither, the amplitude distribution has ‘collapsed’ to its normalized cut-off to the non-halting states N , and the next
letter is read. The numbers pA(x) and pR(x) are now obtained by summing the respective probabilities p σA (x) and
p σR (x) over all letters σ in the word x˜ .
As in the case of probabilistic automata, surveyed in Condon [13], most of the research on quantum finite automata
concerns language recognition with probability p > 12 (hence with bounded error). The one-way probabilistic finite
automata, it is well known since Rabin [28], recognize in this sense the same languages as their deterministic
counterparts, the regular languages. The one-way quantum automata, however, are less powerful, see Brodsky and
Pippenger [11] for an account: the measure-once quantum automata recognize exactly the languages recognized by
the reversible deterministic finite automata; the measure-many quantum automata recognize more languages than this,
but still strictly fewer than the deterministic finite automata do.
Could then ‘going quantum’ reduce the size of a recognizer? Well, Ambainis and Freivalds [1] did prove that
for some languages the size of a recognizing quantum finite automaton can be exponentially smaller than that
of any deterministic, or even probabilistic, finite automaton recognizing the language. However, there are other
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languages, Nayak [24] and Ambainis et al. [3] showed, for which the smallest quantum finite automata, also in Nayak’s
generalized sense, are exponentially larger than their deterministic counterparts.
4. Quantum limited memory learning
We set out to consider Gold-type identification in the limit in a quantum setting, in the hope of finding a model, in
which quantum learning would have advantages over classical learning; deterministic or probabilistic. However, it is
easy to see that all functions computable by quantum computers are recursive, and hence, if unrestricted calculations
are allowed, no advantages of quantum learning can be proved. This is why we impose (severe) memory limitations:
our quantum IIMs are essentially one-way quantum finite automata. These automata, however, as we recalled above,
are strictly less powerful than the deterministic finite automata as language recognizers. Does this mean that they must
also be less powerful as limited memory inference machines? No.
Towards substantiating our claim, we start by sketching the workings of a finite quantum automaton M , when
serving as a quantum limited memory IIM. It is only natural to admit M of the most general kind, as in Nayak [24]
or Wiesner and Crutchfield [35], although, it turns out, already the simplest Moore–Crutchfield [23] model is here of
interest.
Whatever its type, M works one-way, reading the consecutive values σ = f (n) of a total recursive function f
at the input, in the natural order of the argument n = 0, 1, . . .. In doing this, M recognizes σ only modulo a finite
partition [σ ] of the natural numbers; for example, M may recognize the first ν values 0, 1, . . . , ν − 1, and “a larger
integer” L = [σ ], σ ≥ ν. For every value σ it reads, M updates its amplitude distribution, or its density matrix, by a
suitable transformation δ[σ ]. At certain times n, the update is followed by a measurement; if a halting state is observed,
the current value f (n) is output, and M stops.
With the natural numbers serving as names for programs, write φi for the function computed by program i ,
and assume φ1, φ2, . . . forms an acceptable programming sequence. In case M’s output value o computes the input
function, f = φo, the function f has been identified by M . The probability that M identifies f is then the probability
of observing a halting state when f = φ f (n). Write f ∈ QLF I N (M) 〈p〉 if M identifies f with probability at least
p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, and put QLF I N 〈p〉 = {U |∃M (U ⊆ QLF I N (M)〈p〉)}. The notation is ambiguous in that it does
not spell out the type of quantum automaton admitted as M , but we do not insist it should.
It is often convenient to write a total function on the natural numbers as a string of its consecutive values. Recall,
for strings α, β, γ over an alphabet A, with α, β of finite length, and for natural m, n, one interprets αmβnγ in the
usual sense of concatenation, with α p+1 = α pα, and α0 taken as the empty string; one interprets α∞ as the string of
α’s recurring indefinitely.
Let 〈·, ·〉 denote the standard pairing for one-to-one correspondence between pairs of natural numbers and natural
numbers. The mutual recursion theorem of Smullyan, see [29], asserts, for any pair g, h of total recursive functions,
the existence of programs m and n, which compute the same functions as the programs g(〈m, n〉) and h(〈m, n〉),
respectively, do: φm = φg(〈m,n〉) and φn = φh(〈m,n〉). We require this theorem to produce functions in the classes,
which we now define. Throughout, the letter  will stand for any real number in the interval (0, 1).
Definition 4.1. Let V be the set of total functions f = 2αrs2∞, where α is a string of u zeros and v ones, and r, s
are integers greater than 2, all so chosen that cos2 u + sin2 v <  and f = φr , or cos2 v + sin2 u <  and f = φs .
The class V turns out not finitely learnable with limited memory classically, neither in deterministic nor
probabilistic sense, but it is learnable in a quantum sense. We explain these statements in three theorems.
Theorem 4.1. V /∈ LF I N.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that V ⊂ LF I N (M), letw be the number of states of the finite automaton M serving
as our inductive inference machine, and write c for the factorial of w. When processing a sequence of consecutive
zeros (or a sequence of ones) in its input, M eventually starts repeating its internal states with period not exceeding w.
Let p be the least number of initial zeros in a sequence of zeros, after reading which M starts repeating states
regardless of its starting state; let q be the corresponding number of ones. M is thus unable to remember the presence
or absence of any block of zeros, or of ones, the length of which is a multiple of c, and which follows a string 0p or
1q , respectively. M cannot therefore distinguish between input functions differing by such blocks only. It remains to
show that such a pair of distinct functions does exist in V .
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The sequence of natural multiples of an irrational number is uniformly distributed modulo 1, and the number pi
is irrational, see e.g. Thm. 6.3 and Cor. 2.6 in [25]. It follows that for all integer m0, n0, c 6= 0, the double sequence
cos2(m0 + mc) + sin2(n0 + nc), m, n = 1, 2, . . . , is dense in the interval [0, ]. In particular, each inequality
cos2(m0 +mc)+ sin2(n0 + nc) <  has infinitely many solutions; let (m, n) be a solution for (m0, n0) = (p, q), and
let (m′, n′) 6= (n,m) be a solution for (m0, n0) = (q, p).
Put now f = 20p+mc1q+ncrr ′2∞ and f ′ = 20p+n′c1q+m′crr ′2∞, choosing r and r ′ by Smullyan’s theorem so
that f = φr and f ′ = φr ′ . The functions f and f ′ are distinct, both are in V , and they differ by blocks of zeros
following 0p, or of ones following 1q , the lengths of which are multiples of c. 
Theorem 4.2. V /∈ PrLF I N 〈p〉 if p > 12 .
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is a δ > 0 and a probabilistic finite automaton M , which identifies every
f ∈ V finitely with probability greater than 12 + δ, and hence misidentifies f with probability less than 12 − δ. Write
the internal states of M as 1, 2, . . . , s.
Suppose the functions f = 2αrr ′2∞ = φr and f ′ = 2α′rr ′2∞ = φr ′ are in V . Adapting an argument of
Rabin [28], consider the probabilities ξi for M to enter state i after processing the fragment 2α of f , and consider the
probabilities ξ ′i for M to enter state i after processing the fragment 2α′ of f ′. Also, let ψi denote the probabilities for
M to output r if M starts in state i and processes the final fragment rr ′ of a target function.
The probability to output r when processing f then equals ξ1ψ1+· · ·+ξsψs , which is greater than 12 +δ, the value
r being correct. The probability to output r when processing f ′ equals ξ ′1ψ1+· · ·+ ξ ′sψs , which is less than 12 − δ, the
value r now being incorrect. By subtraction, (ξ1−ξ ′1)ψ1+· · ·+(ξs−ξ ′s)ψs > 2δ, hence |ξ1−ξ ′1|+· · ·+|ξs−ξ ′s | > 2δ.
Thus, if f and f ′ are distinguishable by M then the s-dimensional vectors of probabilities ξ and ξ ′ corresponding to
the initial fragments 2α and 2α′, are δ–separated in the sense at hand.
However, reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4.1, one may for any natural c choose α = 0mc1nc and
α′ = 0n′c1m′c, with integers (m′, n′) 6= (n,m) arbitrarily large. Now, it is a basic fact that for every s there is a
natural µ, such that for any s × s stochastic matrix δ, the sequence of powers (δµ)m , m = 1, 2, . . . , converges. Put
c = µ, let δσ be the stochastic matrix by which M transits when reading input value σ = 0, 1, 2, and let ξ0 be M’s





n′δ2ξ0, it is clear that some pair ξ 6= ξ ′
of such vectors is not δ–separated. Hence, some pair of functions f 6= f ′ in V is indistinguishable for M . 
Theorem 4.3. V ∈ QLF I N 〈1− /2 〉 .
Proof. We construct a one-way measure-once real quantum automaton M with ten states, which finitely learns every
function in V with probability at least 1 − /2. Our automaton has four non-halting non-output states {1, 2, 3, 4}
(with 1 as the initial state), four halting output states {6, 7, 9, 10} (when the current input value is output), and two
additional non-halting non-output states {5, 8} used only at the very end of the inference.
The states are thought ordered by the usual ordering of the integers, and, for brevity of account, amplitude
distributions on subsets of states are identified with their extension by zero to all states. Write u for the number
of zero-values of f = 2α r s 2∞ in the class V , and write v for the number of its one-values.
Suppose, with f as input, we can make M behave as follows. The initial amplitude distribution is 1 at the state 1.
When the first value “two” is read, the distribution becomes 1√
2
(1, 1) at the states {1, 3}. When u values “zero” and
v values “one” have been read, the distribution becomes 1√
2
(cos u, sin u, cos v, sin v) at {1, 2, 3, 4}. When the first
input “larger than two” is read, the latter distribution shifts to {5, 6, 7, 8}, and the state is measured with respect to the
partition {{6, 7}, {5, 8}}. If {6, 7} is observed, the current input value r is output. Otherwise, no output is produced, the
second input “larger than two” is read, and the normalized distribution (cos u, sin v) at {5, 8} moves to {9, 10}, with
output of the current input value s, and the termination of inference.
The value r is then output with probability pr = 12 (cos2 v + sin2 u), and the value s is output with probability
ps = 12 (cos2 u + sin2 v), pr + ps = 1. If f = 2α r s 2∞ ∈ V , the output r is correct for f iff cos2 u + sin2 v < , in
which case ps < /2 and pr = 1− ps > 1− /2, and the output s is correct for f iff cos2 v + sin2 u < , in which
case pr < /2 and ps > 1− /2. In either case, M identifies f with probability at least 1− /2.
It remains to exhibit orthogonal matrices δσ , σ = 2, 0, 1, L , with L standing for “larger than two”, which make
M behave as supposed. Somewhat informally, the matrix δ2 ‘turns’ the amplitude distribution by the angle pi/4 in the
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variables {1, 3}, while the matrices δ0 and δ1 turn it by the angle 1 in the variables {1, 2} and {3, 4}, respectively. Thus,
δ0 and δ1 ‘count’ the occurrence of 0 and 1 in the input, each by modulo 2pi adding on the unit angle, with δ2 having
first set both counters to zero.
To write the δσ formally, let, for any pair A, B of square matrices, A ⊕ B denote the least square matrix with A
and B as sub-matrices (‘blocks’) along its dexter diagonal downwards, and all remaining entries zero. Write In for the
n × n identity matrix, write ρθ for the matrix of counter-clockwise rotation by angle θ in the real plane, and write γ
for the matrix ρpi/4⊕ I1 with the last two columns interchanged. Put now δ2 = γ ⊕ I7, δ0 = ρ1⊕ I8, δ1 = I2⊕ρ1⊕ I6,
and let δL effectuate a suitable permutation of the ten states. 
5. Conclusions
Our paper relates both to learning theory and to quantum computation. We do not pretend to have discovered new
effective machine learning algorithms performed by quantum computers. We were interested in theoretical capabilities
and limitations of various learning models. It turns out that there are learning problems for which quantum algorithms
have advantages over classical (deterministic or probabilistic) ones. Such advantages have already been discovered in
papers on quantum computation [32,1,2].
However, quantum learning differs rather much from quantum computation. While quantum finite automata can
recognize only languages recognizable by deterministic finite automata [22], we have here shown that there exist
classes learnable by quantum finite automata, which are not learnable by deterministic finite automata.
It may seem that our Theorem 4.2 relies on usage of quantum finite automata with very special parameters. What
happens if a practical implementation of such an automaton has a slight error in the parameters? A more careful
analysis shows that our quantum automata almost always have advantages over their deterministic counterparts.
Indeed, for Theorem 4.2 it is only essential that the angle used in our matrices for the input symbols 0 and 1, here
chosen as 1, is irrational with respect to pi . This is however true for nearly all possible angles: the uniform probability
to have such an angle is 1, as the probability of an angle which is not irrational with respect to pi equals 0.
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